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Perspectives on twentieth century
philosophy
A Reply to Tom Rockmore
Abstract
In this response paper, I want to address two issues in Tom Rockmore's paper.
First, I will examine the background of some new tendencies in contemporary
philosophy. Second, I want to pay attention to Rockmore's own interpretation of
these tendencies.
1 A turning away from and a return to Hegel?
According toRockmore, three tendenciesdominate20th century'sphilosoph-
ical debate, viz. the so-called continental philosophy, Anglo-American analytical
philosophy, and American (neo-)pragmatism.1 Between continental and analytic
philosophy, being the two most important tendencies, hardly any debate was tak-
ing place; thiswas due to ignorance, scorn, andmutual lack of attention. However,
this situation is gradually changing: especially American philosophers like Taylor,
Nagel, Rorty and others discuss subjects in which until recently only continen-
tal philosophers used to be interested. Things have also changed in continental
philosophy, albeit less clearly. I want to examine the background of this shifts
and make a proposal to interpret them: in my view, these diverging philosophical
trends can be seen as responses to Hegel's philosophy.
First, a preliminary remark. When I refer to Hegel in my interpretation, I
do not only mean Hegel's philosophy in the strict sense; rather, I consider his
thinking as the apex of a certain philosophical project. Its core was to understand
the whole of reality, nature as well as history, matter as well as spirit, as man-
ifestations of the absolute idea. According to some, the earliest sources of this
project go back to Plato, but in any case it clearly comes to the fore in modern
philosophy since Descartes. In general, this project can be brought under the
heading of foundationalism; more specically, analytic philosophy usually calls it
metaphysics, while continental philosophy describes it primarily as ontotheology.
In a sense, both analytic and continental philosophy of the 20th century turn away
from this project, albeit in very different ways.
Let me begin with analytic philosophy. As Rockmore remarks, analytic phi-
losophy opposed right from its beginning English neo-hegelianism of Bradley's
sort and similar ones. It did not only criticize the latter's denial of the existence of
an external world (anyway an unjust criticism), but also the bombastic, obscure
1. See TomRockmore, `Remarks on the structure of twentieth century philosophy,' Ars Dis-
putandi 3 (2003), [http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000128/index.html].
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style of Hegel's writings (and of most of his contemporaries), as well as his ten-
dency to understand everything from the point of view of the totality: das Wahre
ist das Ganze. Analytic philosophy took a great deal of its specic character from
this threefold rejection of Hegel as the champion of dogmatic metaphysics. In the
rst place, instead of all embracing, synthetic constructions with a highly specu-
lative content, it focused on the analysis of concrete small scale problems. Hence
its name: analytic philosophy. Secondly, instead of long, complicated sentences,
which looked more like Latin than German, analytic philosophy opted for clear,
short sentences, closely related to ordinary language, it opted for starting from
examples, taken from everyday life, and nally, it opted for a high degree of com-
mon sense. Thirdly, whereas Hegel superseded the contingency of experienced
reality in the absolute idea, analytic philosophy focused on the problem of the way
in which language or thought can refer to concrete, extramental reality. Because
of all these reasons, analytic philosophy can be interpreted as a turning away from
the speculative character of Hegel's metaphysics and a turning to ordinary lan-
guage, which Rorty calls the linguistic turn. The way in which analytic philosophy
renounced Hegel's philosophy consisted in ignoring it and in taking for granted
all kinds of prejudices with regard to this philosophy.
On the other side, we nd continental philosophy. I agree with Rockmore
that Heidegger is the key-person in order to understand continental philosophy.
However, I think that his thinking is not somuch to be understood as a response to
Husserl, but rather as an attempt to overcome metaphysics, in particular Hegel's.
The same holds true for other continental philosophers like Levinas, Derrida and
even Habermas. According to Heidegger, Hegel's philosophy is the apex of on-
totheology, the confusion of the questions of being and of God. Consequently,
in Hegel's philosophy, the plurality and the historicity of being cannot be con-
ceptualised, since it grounds this contingency on God as the absolute ground.
Although both analytic and continental philosophy rejected Hegel's metaphysics,
they largely differed in the manner in which they distantiated themselves from
his project. In spite of all their criticisms, not only Heidegger, but also Levinas,
Derrida, and Habermas are very much indebted to the Hegelian project; their aim
is to show the unthought in his metaphysics in order to overcome it.
However, if we take a look at more recent developments in Anglo-American
philosophy, we see a growing interest in Hegel; one need to think only of Rorty's
neopragmatism and the philosophy of Charles Taylor. This interest is connected
with a certain disappointment of analytic philosophy. Since, although it rejected
foundationalist metaphysics, it was nevertheless foundationalist in its epistemol-
ogy, as the example of the Vienna circle makes clear. But precisely because of
its approach of epistemological questions, it gradually became more and more
formalistic and moved away from concrete reality. Moreover, it proved to be un-
successful in solving its central (foundationalist) problem, the issue of reference,
in a satisfactory way. That is why analytic philosophy became interested again
in all kinds of concrete human and social questions. After the linguistic turn it
made, as it were, a turn to culture. Due to this turn, however, other aspects of
Hegel's thought came to the fore in analytic philosophy, especially throughRorty's






























Perspectives on twentieth century philosophy
neopragmatism and Taylor. Beyond the coercive systematic of dialectics and the
dogmatic aspects of his work, beyond the abstruse character of his writings, it dis-
covered a Hegel more sensitive to hermeneutical questions, analyzing with great
subtlety all kinds of crucial questions of our culture, religion, history, law, art
etcetera. The metaphysical Hegel of the Encyclopedia was in a way exchanged
with the cultural-philosophical Hegel of the Phenomenology. As a consequence of
this turn, the debate with continental philosophy was taken up again and proved
to be fruitful. In continental philosophy, the interest for fundamental questions
about our times and culture was growing as well. The provisional result of this
process is that both analytic and continental philosophy seem to agree that in our
times philosophy should be more than ever `ihre Zeit in Gedanken erfasst,' which
is indeed a very Hegelian idea of the task of philosophy.
My proposal to understand the recent developments in analytic and conti-
nental philosophy is the following: they can be interpreted in terms of a double
movement of turning away from the metaphysical Hegel on the one hand, and
turning towards the hermeneutical Hegel on the other; alternatively phrased, as
a turn away from foundationalist epistemology and metaphysics and a turn to
(non-foundationalist) philosophy of culture.
2 The consequences of Kant's Copernican revolution
In the second part of his paper, Rockmore presents his own interpretation
of the relation between analytic philosophy, continental philosophy and (neo-
)pragmatism. Kant's Copernican revolution and its implications pay a key role in
his analysis. Roughly spoken the consequence of this revolution is the following:
in order to be able to perceive and to know, the subject does not passively reg-
ister the sensuous impressions coming to his sense-organs, but plays an active,
constructive role in the process of knowledge. As Rockmore shows, the impor-
tance of this revolution can hardly be overestimated. It causes a break between
pre- and post-kantian philosophy, between pre-modern realism and post-modern
constructivism. Seen from this perspective, the project of analytic philosophy,
trying to prove whatever avour of realism, has failed. In the Anglo-American
world the positive result of this failure is pragmatism, which has replaced analytic
philosophy to a large extent. Pragmatism takes the Copernican revolution as its
point of departure and fully accepts its constructivistic consequences.
I would like to elaborate on this interpretation of Rockmore. It is beyond
doubt that Kant's Copernican revolution paved the way for all kinds of contempo-
rary constructivism. But Kant was also a child of the Enlightenment, a movement
in which everything seems to hing upon the universality of reason. Kant took
this crucial element into account by stressing the universality of the categories
of understanding. The subject that construes knowledge is not an empirical, but
a transcendental subject. This means that the categories, which constitute the
mould with which it construes knowledge, are subjective. But at the same time
they are also transcendental, i.e. universal conditions of our knowledge. Due
































in particular from Marx, Kierkegaard and even more clearly from Nietzsche and
Heidegger onwards, this universality of the knowing subject is seriously under-
mined. The categories upon which the knowledge of the subject are based, are
rooted in ideological and psychological concerns; they are manifestations of the
will to power or dependent on a certain givenness of being. In this way an aware-
ness of radical niteness or perspectivity is introduced in philosophy, a niteness
which renders any appeal to universality problematic. Moreover, this awareness
not only dominates contemporary philosophy but also culture in general; in this
respect, we only need to think of the issue of multiculturalism. It is obvious that
pragmatism and continental philosophy take this contemporary consciousness of
radical niteness much more into account than analytic philosophy.
On the basis of my supplement to Rockmore's interpretation of the structure
of 20th century philosophy, I want to draw a totally different conclusion than
his. The promise for the philosophy of the 21st century is not so much a further
elaboration of constructivism, as Rockmore suggests, but looking for an answer to
the extremely complex issue of how we, with all our niteness and perspectivism,
can keep an open mind for the innite and the universal. If we think of ourselves
as being able to know reality from an absolute point of view, something of which
foundationalist metaphysics and epistemology are dreaming, this is obviously at
odds with the reality of our human niteness; but if, on the other hand, we feel
completely comfortable with our nite, subjective constructions and feel no need
to reach for something beyond our own subjectivity, we frustrate a fundamental
element of what it means to be human as well, viz. the drive to discuss with others
questions of what makes life worth living, about how we can do justice to others,
about how we, with all our constructions, may get a view, however imperfect, of
the essential.2
2. Paper presented at a conference at Utrecht University, The Netherlands, June 26th,
2003.
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